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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BACKWARDS TO THE CAUTIONARY RULE: S v Van der Ross 2002 (2) SACR
362 (C)
The judgment of Thring J in S v Van der Ross1 raises a number of ghosts
in respect of the evaluation of the evidence of complainants in sexual
offence cases. As noted by the court in Van der Ross, the Supreme Court
of Appeal in the 1998 case of S v Jackson2 very clearly held that the
common law cautionary approach to complainants in sexual offence
cases was irrational and had no place in our law.3 The Supreme Court of
Appeal also made it clear that evidence in a particular case might call for
a cautionary approach and quoted, inter alia, the following portion of
Lord Taylor CJ’s dictum in R v Makanjuola, R v Easton:4
In some cases, it may be appropriate for the judge to warn the jury to exercise caution
before acting upon the unsupported evidence of a witness. This will not be so simply
because the witness is a complainant of a sexual offence nor will it necessarily be so
because a witness is alleged to be an accomplice. There will need to be an evidential basis
for suggesting that the evidence of the witness may be unreliable. An evidential basis does
not include mere suggestions by cross examining counsel.5
This qualification that, in some instances, a cautionary approach might
still be justified led the South African Law Commission to conclude that
the cautionary rule had not been abolished but merely reformulated and
consequently the dangers of its prejudicial effects remained.6 The iniquity
of this particular cautionary rule has been the subject of many journal
articles, many of which are reflected in the South African Law
Commission’s Discussion Paper7 and in S v Jackson.8 The Commission
accordingly recommended in its final Report that the cautionary rule in
sexual offences be expressly abolished in a new Sexual Offences Act.9
Prior to S v Van der Ross it could be argued (and I confess that I was a
proponent of this argument) that little could be served by abolishing a
rule that was already abolished, and that Olivier JA’s dictum merely
required that the evaluation of the testimony of a complainant in a sexual
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1 2002 (2) SACR 362 (C).
2 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA).
3 Ibid 476e-f.
4 [1995] 3 All ER 730 CA.
5 Ibid 733c-d. See also S v M 1999 (2) SACR 548 (SCA).
6 Discussion Paper 102: Sexual Offences: Process and Procedure Project 107 (2002) paras
31.2.4.5-31.2.4.10.
7 Ibid.
8 Note 2 above.
9 South African Law Commission, Project 107 Sexual Offences Report (December 2002) para
5.2.3.
offence case be placed on the same footing as any other witness.
Unfortunately, Van der Ross’ case suggests that the Law Commission’s
fears were not unfounded.
In S v Van der Ross the court considered an appeal against a conviction
of rape and a twelve year sentence by a regional court. The court
summarised the relevant facts as follows:10 The complainant was a thirty
year old woman who had lived with the appellant for three years prior to
his arrest on the charge of rape. They had a two year old child and lived
close to the appellant’s parents. According to the appellant, on the
relevant Friday evening he returned home drunk, ate his food and went
to bed. The next day the complainant accused him of raping her and he
was arrested. The complainant testified that the appellant had demanded
sex after going to bed and that she had refused because he was inebriated.
She said that she had an agreement with the appellant that they would
not have sex when he was drunk. However, the appellant proceeded to
undress her and force her to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with
him at least six times in three different positions. On each occasion he
ejaculated. The appellant had no recollection of having sex with the
complainant.
Thring J noted that the complainant was a single witness in respect of
two essential, but disputed, points, namely, the fact that there had been
(i) sexual intercourse and (ii) that it had been non-consensual. The court
noted that the magistrate in the court a quo had cautioned himself
against the dangers inherent in the testimony of a single witness. The
magistrate then came to the conclusion that whilst the appellant had
lacked veracity the complainant was, beyond reasonable doubt, a truthful
witness. The magistrate found the complainant’s testimony to be clear
and satisfactory and devoid of contradictions. The magistrate found no
indication that the complainant might have had a motive to falsely
implicate the appellant. Nevertheless, Thring J held that the magistrate
had failed to sufficiently warn himself against the dangers in the
complainant’s testimony. Thring J then noted that the complainant was
not only a single witness in relation to crucial aspects of the prosecution’s
case, but also that the charge was of a sexual nature and took place in a
domestic situation and, consequently, the magistrate had made a mistake
in only taking into account the single witness status of the complainant.
Thring J summarised the court’s interpretation of S v Jackson as follows:
‘Myns insiens is al wat die uitspraak in S v J beteken dat daar nie
noodwending in elke sodanige saak ’n algemene, onwrikbare versigtigh-
eidsreel op die getuienis van ’n klaagster toegepas hoef to word nie’.11
10 Note 1 above 364.
11 Ibid 365h. Translation: ‘In my view the judgment in S v J merely means that there is not
necessarily, in a case of this nature, a general unyielding (fixed) cautionary rule that must be
applied to the evidence of the complainant’.
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The court then repeated the following extract from the judgement of
Olivier JA: ‘The evidence in a particular case may call for a cautionary . . .
approach’.12 However, it is clear from the judgment that for Thring J
(Erasmus J concurring) it was the sexual nature of the case that provided
the evidential basis for attracting a cautionary approach. The following
passages from the judgment make it difficult to conclude otherwise:
Die klaagster is nie alleenlik ’n enkel getuie wat betref die kern geskilpunte nie: haar
klagte is van ’n seksuele aard, en het in ’n huishoudelike situasie ontstaan.13
Dit is duidelik uit wat hy sê dat, alhoewel die landdros die getuienis van die klaagster
met versigtigheid benader het bloot omdat haar getuienis op die twee kern geskilpunte
alleen gestaan het, hy dit nie nodig geag het om nog meer versigtig te wees omdat haar
klagte een van ’n seksuele aard was nie. In die omstandighede van hierdie saak dink ek
dat die landdros in hierdie opsigte misgetas het.14
Na my oordeel, roep hierdie saak luidkeels vir ’n benadering van die klaagster se
getuienis wat dubbel versigtig is, eerstens omdat sy ’n enkel getuie is, en ook weens die
aard van haar klagte.15
The fact that the charge is one of rape also seems sufficient to attract a
cautionary approach in terms of Thring J’s reasoning where he expresses
the view that ‘criminal courts should be encouraged to exercise extreme
caution before they convict people on serious charges, such as rape,
especially with the introduction of prescribed sentences by the
Legislature’.16 This would seem to be at odds with the reasoning in
Jackson in which the court notes the inequity in imposing a higher
standard of proof in sexual offence case through the application of the
cautionary rule.17 It is trite that in all criminal cases the standard is one of
proof beyond reasonable doubt18 and that this component of the
presumption of innocence, together with the allocation of the burden of
proof, is regarded in many well established democracies as being
sufficient protection against the dangers of a wrong conviction.
Having made these general comments, Thring J then dealt with the
specific circumstances of the case and gave the following reasons for
adopting a ‘double caution’:
1. A long history of domestic squabbling and friction which included
verbal abuse by both parties as well as mutual accusations of
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid 364h. Translation: ‘The complainant is not only a single witness in respect of the core
issues: her complaint is of a sexual nature, and stemmed from a domestic situation’.
14 Ibid 365d. Translation: ‘Even though the magistrate had approached the complainant’s
evidence with caution because her evidence stood alone on two core issues, it is also clear from
what he says that he did not consider it necessary that he had to be extra cautious because her
complaint was of a sexual nature’.
15 Ibid 365i. Translation: ‘In my view this case cries out for a double cautious approach to the
complainant’s evidence: not only because she is a single witness, but also because of the nature
of the complaint’.
16 Ibid headnote. See also 365g.
17 Note 2 above, 475j.
18 S v Sinkanka 1963 (2) SA 531 (A).
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unfaithfulness. The appellant also testified that the complainant
frequently threatened him when he was drunk that he ‘sal sien wat
hom sal oorkom’.19 Thring J held that from experience it was known
that such an atmosphere of continual family friction was fertile
ground for false accusations of all kinds. The court noted that in
these cases the court frequently had to hear long and bitter but
largely irrelevant testimony of the intimate details of a couple’s
private life. This, Thring J noted, was the price to be paid for
legislating that a man could be guilty of marital rape.20
2. The complainant was examined by a district surgeon at 7 pm the
evening after the alleged rape. The district surgeon found no injuries
and no indications that the complainant had had sexual intercourse.
However, the court noted that this evidence was neutral in that the
district surgeon testified that the complainant was menstruating
when he examined her. However, the court noted that this meant
that there was no medical corroboration of the complainant’s
version and noted further that the complainant had also testified that
she had no visible injuries as a result of the repeated rapes.
3. The court held ‘met alle verskuldigde respek aan die manhaftigheid
(sic) van die appellant’21 that the complainant’s testimony that the
appellant had had full sexual intercourse with her six times in less
than an hour was farfetched. The court then alluded to a scene in
Macbeth to highlight this point: ‘Die opmerking van die hekwag in
Macbeth is te goed bekend om dit nodig te maak om dit hier te
herhaal’.22 This is a reference to a scene of comic relief in which a
porter makes a comment to the effect that alchohol provokes desire
but detracts from the ability to fulfill such desire.
4. The court also noted that it was common cause that the appellant
was significantly inebriated on the night of the alleged rape, and that
the complainant had testified that the appellant went to sleep after
the alleged rape and slept until midday the following day. However,
the complainant made no attempt to leave the appellant during the
night and complained to no one until approximately 11 o’clock the
following morning when she made a report to the appellant’s
mother. The appellant’s mother testified that the complainant told
her that her son had been drunk and that she was unhappy that he
wanted to have intercourse with her when drunk and that he had
told her to lie on her back and then on her side. The appellant’s
mother in response to questioning also said that the complainant
looked normal and had no visible injuries when she made the report.
19 Note I above 366c-d. Translation: ‘will see what will happen to him’.
20 Ibid 366c-d.
21 Ibid 366g-h. Translation: ‘with all due respect to the courage/bravery of the appellant’.
22 Ibid 366g. Translation: ‘The remark of the gatekeeper in Macbeth is too well-known to require
repetition in this judgment’.
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Thring J concluded that the complainant’s inactivity and silence coupled
with her normal appearance and the contents of her report to the
appellant’s mother and the absence of any medical corroboration of the
complainant’s story made her version of events suspicious.
Although Thring J agreed with the magistrate’s finding that the
appellant was a poor witness, he held that this did not cure the serious
weaknesses in the complainant’s testimony. Accordingly the magistrate
had erred in merely applying the cautionary rule applicable to single
witnesses in that he should have approached the evidence of the
complainant with a double caution (‘dubbele versigtigheid’). He held
that if the magistrate had taken the appropriate cautionary approach, he,
in all likelihood, would have reached a different conclusion. Conse-
quently the appeal succeeded and the conviction and sentence were set
aside.
The emphasis placed by Thring J on the sexual nature of the offence
makes it difficult to refute the argument that Jackson does little else than
reformulate the cautionary rule. The alternative is that Thring J was
wrong in his interpretation of Jackson. If Jackson were to be read as
simply permitting the sexual nature of the offence to provide a sufficient
‘evidential basis’ for applying a cautionary approach, its ruling that the
cautionary rule has no place in our law is meaningless. In defence of
Thring J, it might be argued that, although great emphasis was placed on
the sexual nature of the offence, it was the specific circumstances of the
case that called for caution other than that applicable to a single witness.
It then becomes necessary to re-examine the specific circumstances
identified by Thring J.
The first point was that there was a history of domestic squabbling.
The court’s observations in this regard are summarised above. Other than
the court’s general observation that experience shows that domestic
friction provides a fertile ground for false accusations, it is difficult to
ascertain how the evidence supports a specific motive for laying a false
charge. The complainant testified that the couple had an agreement that
they would not have sexual intercourse when the appellant was drunk –
nowhere in the judgement is this aspect of the complainant’s evidence
questioned. (This agreement is arguably echoed in the complainant’s
report to the appellant’s mother). The most apparent motive for laying a
charge would be to prevent the appellant demanding sexual intercourse
when drunk. This would be consistent with the complainant’s version of
events. Marital/partner rape is arguably less likely to occur when the
parties have a relationship free from domestic friction – if the existence of
domestic friction on its own provides an evidential basis for taking a
cautionary approach it would seem inevitable that a cautionary approach
will always be applied to sexual assault in a domestic setting. The
rationality of such an approach is far from obvious and will certainly
detract from the long awaited protection afforded women by the
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
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The next specific circumstance was the absence of visible injuries. The
judgment does not allow us to discern whether there was any judicial
reflection on the many possible reasons as to why there would be no
visible injuries other than the fact that the complainant was menstruating
at the time of the medical examination. Although Thring J notes that the
medical evidence is neutral,23 it is clear it is a factor that the court takes
into account in its conclusion that the complainant’s version lacks
veracity.24 Given the neutrality of the medical evidence it is difficult to see
how it could provide grounds for invoking a cautionary approach.
Another specific factor taken into account by the court was the
complainant’s account of the sexual intercourse itself. It is unclear
precisely what aspect the court found farfetched: the fact that the accused
could sustain an erection that would permit him to penetrate the accused
six times or the number of times the appellant was alleged to have
ejaculated? It is also difficult to ascertain the source of the court’s
knowledge in regard to these matters. Judicial notice cannot be based on
a judge’s personal experience so this possibility must be excluded,
Shakespeare also cannot be regarded as a judicial authority (or any other)
on such matters. Unfortunately the judgment does not reflect whether
any evidence was led in this regard and consequently it is very difficult to
ascertain whether this is indeed a reasonable basis for applying a double
cautionary rule. If indeed it is simply a matter of common sense then the
danger that a single witness may exaggerate is surely something that can
be adequately guarded against by applying the cautionary rule applicable
to single witnesses.
The fourth factor taken into account by court was the complainant’s
failure to leave the accused once he had fallen asleep and her failure to
make a report before 11 in the morning following the alleged rape
coupled with her normal appearance. (The prejudicial effect and
irrationality of the exception to the rule that prohibits previous consistent
statements on grounds of irrelevancy have been discussed extensively
elsewhere and are not repeated here.25) The court does not reflect in its
judgment any consideration of the plethora of reasonable explanations as
to why the complainant acted as she did. For example, the appellant no
longer posed a danger, the possibility that the complainant might have
taken time to reflect on the consequences of laying a charge bearing in
mind that the appellant was the father of their young child, the absence of
a sympathetic person to report to (‘mother-in-laws’ stereotypically fall
out of this category). It is also difficult to ascertain from the extract of the
record reflected in the judgment as to what inconsistencies the court
23 Ibid 366f.
24 Ibid 367c.
25 See for example the South African Law Commission’s Discussion Paper (note 6 above).
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found in the complainant’s report to the appellant’s mother and the
complainant’s testimony. Again the court notes that the complainant
showed no visible injuries and appeared normal when making the report
to the appellant’s mother. There are two issues here. Firstly, if demeanour
when making a report of a sexual assault is sufficient on its own to
provide an evidential basis for adopting a double cautionary approach,
then it will be extremely easy to resurrect the irrational cautionary rule
referred to in Jackson. The second and related issue is what is an
appropriate demeanour in such circumstances? It is submitted that if
normality is to be regarded as an indicator of mendacity then we
apparently have not progressed beyond the ‘hue and cry’ rule recorded by
Bracton in the 13th century which required the complainant
to go at once and while the deed is newly done, with hue and cry, to the neighbouring
townships and there show the injury done her to men of good repute, the blood and
clothing stained with blood, and her torn garments.26
Of course this is hyperbole, nevertheless the judgment in Van der Ross,
even if found to be based on an incorrect interpretation of Jackson,
certainly lends credence to the Law Commission’s submission that
legislation is required to expressly abolish the cautionary rule and that
the rules pertaining to previous consistent statements need to be
revised.27 It also clearly indicates that if the proposed Sexual Offences
legislation is going to meet its objectives, it needs to be accompanied by
judicial training at all levels.
PJ SCHWIKKARD
Professor of Law
University of Cape Town
26 H de Bracton On the Law and Customs of England translated by FE Thorne (1968).
27 Sexual Offences Report (note 9 above) paras 5.1 5.2.3; 5.3.3.
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